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The response and recovery to COVID-19 in Nepal offers opportunities of designing 
short- and medium-term strategies that support a greener and more sustainable 
recovery. The impact and sustainability of such a strategy will depend on the methods 
adopted for evidence-based project design and selection. We believe that the political 
sustainability of a building back greener (BBG) strategy in low-income contexts will 
depend on finding green projects that satisfy two conditions, and the number of 
projects that satisfy these conditions depend critically on a third. To be politically 
sustainable in a poor country, green projects have to be 
 
• Financially viable, in particular, their net fiscal cost has to be low, and  
• Have high developmental impact in terms of job creation, income growth and 
poverty reduction.  
 
The number of projects that satisfy these conditions is likely to depend on a third 
critical condition:  
• The effectiveness of implementation, which determines both the quality of what is 
delivered (and hence its developmental impact) as well as the cost (and hence 
financial viability).  
 
The effectiveness of implementation depends not just on obvious factors like the skills 
of workers and the capabilities of the organizations engaged in their delivery. It also 
depends on the political economy affecting the incentives of supplying organizations 
and public officials and agencies on the demand side. We argue that developing a set 
of sustainable green projects will require an evidence-based approach to improve the 
effectiveness of implementation of potentially viable projects. 
 
To remain viable over time, projects have to be politically sustainable, by which we 
mean there has to be sufficient political support to sustain funding requirements over 
time. Figure 1 shows how financial viability, developmental impact and the 
effectiveness of implementation jointly determine the set of sustainable green 
projects. In developing countries, sustainability requires a combination of high 
development impact and low financing cost. The number of green projects that pass 
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this test will in turn depend on the quality of implementation. As a result, although 
the universe of potential green projects may appear to be large, the set of projects at 
the intersection of these conditions (shown by the green area in Figure 1) may be small 
or even non-existent. Low implementation effectiveness may not block projects that 
are able to generate market revenues despite their poor implementation. But it is very 
likely to block projects that require public co-financing, which is often the case with 
green projects. Poor implementation can make these projects financially and 
politically unsustainable far more quickly.  
 
Fortunately, the effectiveness of implementation can be improved by understanding 
the economic and political factors limiting implementation quality. Addressing any 
issues that may be feasible to address in the short run may improve implementation 
quality sufficiently to tip some projects into the sustainable space. In many cases it 
may be possible to improve effectiveness by redesigning contracts and the funding 
models of projects. This can affect the types of organizations that may bid for projects 
and may make it more difficult for fund flows to be distorted by interested parties. If 
project and financing design can improve implementation, it will expand the set of 
sustainable projects, as Figure 1 shows, by improving developmental impact, or 




Figure 1 Project selection: the critical role of implementation effectiveness  
 
In the following sections we discuss the four project selection criteria: green impact, 
financial viability, implementation effectiveness and developmental impact. We 
conclude with an outline of a proposed evidence-based method for the identification 
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and development of politically sustainable green projects. The method suggested is 
preliminary and will have to be fleshed out in more detail later. Discussions in DFID 
have already suggested distinctions between building-back-greener projects in terms 
of the degree of risk they entail, from lower-risk (no-regret) projects to higher-risk 
(higher ambition) projects (DFID 2020). Our framework contributes to this discussion 
by identifying different types of risks (with a particular focus on the Nepal context) 
and suggests how these risks may be systematically assessed using evidence and 
analysis to support project selection and development.  
 
The distinctive feature of green investments is that typically they involve desirable 
externalities and are therefore subject to more extensive market failures than other 
comparable projects. Significant market failures mean that many projects are only 
likely to be viable if any ‘financing gaps’ that dissuade private investors can be met 
with public co-financing. But ironically, the involvement of public co-financing may 
adversely affect the quality of implementation in contexts of weak governance. 
Subsidies are frequently subject to rent-seeking distortions, and informal 
arrangements are likely to emerge that can obstruct the achievement of cost-effective 
high-impact results. Without corrective responses, the provision of fiscal support to 
projects may affect underlying costs and qualities and make projects unsustainable. In 
terms of Figure 1, many apparently feasible projects may not prove to be in the green 
lens when implemented unless the quality of implementation can be kept high despite 
any rent-seeking incentives.  To ensure that green projects prove to be sustainable, 
implementation quality has to be given particular attention, both to deselect projects 
that are unlikely to be implemented in a sustainable way, and to use contextual 
evidence to design projects and financing arrangements to improve their 
implementation quality where possible.  
 
 
1. Green sectors and projects  
Green investment opportunities are normally understood as investments that reduce 
the carbon footprint of production and consumption processes, or reduce damaging 
greenhouse and other emissions, or improve the sustainability of livelihoods by 
reducing the depletion of natural capital in production and consumption. Work 
already done in Nepal and other developing countries has developed relevant criteria 
for identifying green technologies and identified many promising sectors and 
technologies in countries like Nepal (GGGI 2017; Hepburn, et al. 2020). Prior research 
in Nepal and elsewhere can help to quickly identify a list of relevant green investments, 
and we take these as our starting point. 
 
Not all investments supporting sustainable or resilient growth are necessarily green. 
For instance, investments that improve resilience to natural disasters like earthquakes 
may not satisfy the conventional definition unless there are specific aspects of these 
investments that are relevant. We have no particular preference that excludes such 
Key takeaway: The set of sustainable green projects can be expanded by designing 




investments, but if we wish to include resilient growth investments (which may be 
important in Nepal), the definition of ‘greener’ growth needs to be amended at the 
outset to prevent confusion. In contrast, investments in renewable energy, in 
developing eco-tourism by investing in the protection of fragile environments, in 
terracing agriculture to conserve water, or in sustainable water use are examples of 
potential investments in Nepal that meet existing definitions.  
 
Measurement  
The contribution of projects to green objectives can be measured by ‘green’ scores for 
projects in terms of their contribution to carbon savings or other green criteria. These 
may be difficult to assess precisely not only because the science is often complex and 
contested, but also because the eventual benefits may critically depend on the quality 
and scale of implementation. How important is an assessment of green scores likely 
to be for project selection in developing countries? Given the many other risks of 
project implementation, developing countries are unlikely to adopt very new or 
untried technologies on the basis of their green scores, if their financial viability, 
implementability or developmental impact are not yet clear. The technologies where 
evidence on the latter dimensions are better established are likely to be ones where 
the green contribution is less in dispute, even though the benefits may be uncertain 
due to the quality of implementation. However, implementation quality is of concern 
anyway to achieve sustainability with reference to economic viability and 
development impact. 
 
It may not therefore be necessary to separately assess the precise green impact of 
projects whose potential contribution to green outcomes is likely to be positive. A 
ranking of projects by their green scores is only likely to matter if there are many green 
projects that are financially viable, implementable and capable of delivering a high 
social impact, and we have to choose between them. Investment allocation may then 
depend on relative green scores. In a typical low-income country, the problem is likely 
to be the reverse. The risks on other dimensions are likely to severely restrict the list 
of feasible projects in the list of potential green projects. In the optimistic case where 
a choice still has to be made, we may only need to rank a relatively small number of 
projects in terms of their contribution to green recovery.  
 
It may therefore be sufficient to begin with a list of potential green investments 
relevant for Nepal as identified in the literature and work downwards in terms of the 
three other criteria to narrow down project selection and improve project design. A 
strategy for evidence-based comparison of green impact may not be the immediate 
priority but we may have to develop appropriate criteria later if there are many 
projects that are otherwise feasible.  
 
Key takeaway: The subset of technically feasible green projects that will pass the 
tests of financial viability, developmental impact and implementability may be 
relatively small, so as long as projects contribute to a greener recovery, it may not 




2. Financial Viability  
Financial viability is likely to be an important constraint determining which if any green 
investments can be adopted and the scale of adoption. The return on investments in 
green technologies is likely to involve a component of non-monetizable social benefits, 
like reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. These investments can enhance social or 
global welfare but do not necessarily generate equivalent market profits for investors. 
In addition, there may be additional market failures associated with risks facing 
investors in developing countries in projects that have large up-front commitments 
and generate returns over longer periods. The contract-enforcement risks can in turn 
raise the cost of capital. Taken together, the market failures affecting green 
investments typically result in private returns being lower than social returns, and in 
turn leads to underinvestment.  
 
Promoting investments in these areas usually requires some level of public co-
financing or other forms of financial support to make the investments viable. Provision 
of green investments entirely through the public sector is unlikely to be effective in 
developing countries for most projects as it may be even more difficult to control costs, 
or to assess the relative efficiency of different investments. A better model is to 
identify the minimum level of co-financing or co-investment that may induce private 
investments in identified sectors or projects. The minimum public financial support 
required can be defined as the financing gap of the project.  
 
The financing gap measures the stream of external financial support required to make 
investments in specific green projects viable over the lifetime of the project. The lower 
the gap, the more sustainable the project.  
 
Our definition of the financing gap is similar to the ‘viability gap’ identified by NREP 
for renewable energy projects that it plans to fund through allocations from its 
challenge fund (NREP 2020). Green technologies are only likely to take off if 
governments and development partners see the value of such an approach more 
broadly, with co-financing of financing gaps being seen as a way of achieving 
significant developmental impacts as well as contributing to greener growth.  
 
As the type and magnitude of the market failure can vary greatly across different 
technologies, sectors and countries as a result of differences in technological 
capabilities, market and governance conditions and income levels, there are likely to 
be significant differences in the financing gap across projects. Country- and sector-
specific estimates of relevant financing gaps can help determine the relative viability 
of different projects.  
 
The financing gap has to be estimated beyond the construction phase of the 
infrastructure (like solar panels or eco-trekking paths), to include deficits in 
operational costs through the lifetime of the project (for instance if the price the 
market is willing to pay for solar power or eco-tourism does not cover all the 
operational costs of delivering these services). Without arrangements for funding any 
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such financing gap, money invested in setting up projects may turn out to have been 
wasted if the assets are scrapped because their operating costs cannot be covered.  
 
The financing gap will depend not only on the technologies used and the technical 
capabilities of the providers but also on background market and governance 
conditions. For instance, an important market failure in green power projects is often 
the high risk-perception of investors in contexts of poor governance and risks to 
contract enforcement over time. This can raise the cost of capital and lead to power 
pricing that is above the capacity of the market to bear. Public co-financing in the form 
of risk-mitigating subsidies may then be essential to attract investments in greener 
power technologies (Waissbein, et al. 2013; Jacobs 2020).  
 
However, evidence from Bangladesh shows that the design of these subsidies is critical. 
Some subsidy designs support a ‘collusive risk mitigation strategy’ that attracts 
politically connected investors with much higher power prices and dirtier technologies. 
On the other hand, by tweaking subsidy design, the subsidy can have a ‘competitive 
risk-mitigation’ effect in the same country and governance context, and result in 
cheaper cleaner power (Khan, et al. 2020). The way in which a potential financing gap 
is met, the instruments used and their appropriateness for that governance context 
are therefore important because they determine both the actual financing gap and 
the type of outcome produced by the financing.  
 
It is therefore important not to see the financing gap as a given, but to engage in 
project and financing design to minimize the financing gap and improve the quality of 
the outcome.   
 
In the longer run, green projects need to be supported by governments, and not just 
development partners. To the extent that there is a call on domestic tax revenues to 
support the financing gap, it is necessary to consider the net fiscal cost of the project: 
the fiscal support that it requires on an annualized basis after accounting for increases 
in tax revenues attributable to the project. In the best-case scenario, there could be 
sufficient additional economic activities triggered by the project to generate 
additional tax revenue equal to or greater than its financing gap. In this scenario, the 
net fiscal cost could be zero or better, and the country could rapidly increase the 
number of green investments without adversely affecting the budget. In an 
intermediate scenario, the tax revenues may be limited to taxes paid by the project 
and its supply chain, but this too could reduce the net fiscal cost of the support over 
time. In the least attractive scenario, there may be no additional tax revenue and the 
annual net fiscal cost would be equal to the financing gap.  
 
When there is a persistent financing gap, the government and its development 
partners have to be willing to pay for the non-monetizable positive externalities of 
green investments with tax revenues or external financing. In a fiscally constrained 
environment, this constraint is likely to be the most binding one. A developing country 
government choosing between two green projects is likely to look first at their net 








Employment programmes versus investment projects  
Developing countries often have employment support programmes like the Prime 
Minister Employment Programme (PMEP) in Nepal.  During the COVID-19 response, 
programmes like PMEP are likely to be scaled up to protect livelihoods, providing an 
opportunity to use these programmes to support labour-intensive investments for a 
greener recovery. PMEP was already being used prior to the pandemic to target areas 
potentially supportive of a greener economy, including tree plantation, public toilet 
construction, road construction and improvements (which can be green to the extent 
that the construction is protective of the environment), drainage repair, soil irrigation, 
drinking water and irrigation projects, and developing trekking trails. However, in a 
relatively poor economy with fiscal constraints, concerns had already been expressed 
by experts and officials that if all that was achieved was poor quality assets or the 
wrong types of construction, this would be tantamount to giving welfare handouts, a 
strategy that may not be sustainable on a large scale in a poor economy (Mandal 2019). 
These concerns may become more serious if PMEP is to be scaled up significantly 
during the COVID-19 crisis and beyond and provides an opportunity for introducing a 
more robust methodology of project design and selection. 
 
While there is a formal distinction between employment programmes and investment 
programmes, in a context of limited fiscal resources it may be useful to engage in 
project selection with overlapping evaluation criteria in terms of financial viability and 
development impact. The primary objective of employment programmes is, of course, 
an immediate welfare improvement by providing incomes to poor people, while public 
investment programmes may be justified in terms of broader developmental and 
financial criteria. However, in a resource constrained economy, if welfare spending 
can be converted from pure transfers to asset-construction aligned with a building-
back-greener strategy, the welfare programmes may become fiscally and politically 
more sustainable. An employment programme should still focus on investments in 
labour-intensive asset construction employing the poorest and most vulnerable. But 
subject to this requirement, if they can mobilize labour to construct assets that 
enhance returns to related green investments, this will reduce their own fiscal cost 
while contributing to the returns on related investments.  
 
The joint effect of employment and investment programmes can thereby be enhanced 
through coordination. For instance, an employment programme that developed 
trekking routes could enhance the returns to investments in eco-tourism facilities and 
reduce the financing gap required for the latter. At the same time, the tax revenues 
Key takeaway: The financing gap is a critical determinant of project sustainability. 
Projects whose net fiscal costs are lower than their financing gap are particularly 
attractive for governments because they enable greater scaling up given the fiscal 




paid by hotels and tour operators could reduce the net fiscal cost of the employment 
programme building trekking routes. Thus, a well-designed employment programme 
could reduce the net financing cost of investment projects and the latter could reduce 
the net fiscal cost of the employment programme. All of this assumes that the projects 
under both are effectively implemented, kept within budget, and deliver assets of the 






The estimation of the financing gap should be a two-stage process given the likely 
importance of implementation effectiveness in determining the size of the gap. The 
first stage is to estimate the notional financing gap using current market prices and 
estimates of market opportunities. Given the known characteristics of the technology 
from other contexts, a calculation based on plausible market demand for the product 
or service and the known market costs of capital and inputs can provide an estimate 
of the net profit or loss that may notionally be expected from the project. As there are 
likely to be market failures affecting the good or service, the notional return is likely 
to be lower than the minimum required by private investors and may even be negative. 
The notional financing gap is the additional public co-financing that would be required 
to induce private investors to invest in the project.  
 
This estimation is only notional because it assumes that local companies or delivery 
organizations have the capacity to convert inputs into outputs with the same 
efficiency as observed in other places. In other words, it assumes that the 
organizational, technical and management capabilities of the delivery organizations 
are similar to what we observe elsewhere, and subject to the same incentives and 
compulsions to control costs and seek markets and that an appropriately skilled 
workforce is available. These assumptions usually do not hold because there are 
significant differences in delivery capabilities across organizations, sectors and 
countries as well as in external governance and market constraints. The actual 
financing gap will depend on the capabilities and incentives of delivery organizations, 
and the adequacy of external conditions and governance arrangements. These factors 
will determine the quality of implementation that we discuss later. 
 
Apart from the capabilities of suppliers, the market and governance context can 
matter to a great extent. If investors face competitive pressures, for instance if they 
actually face losses on their investments when they fail to control costs or fail to 
develop new markets, their profit-seeking efforts may contain the actual financing gap 
to close to the notional one. The actual may even decline over time. If on the other 
Key takeaway: Employment programmes should try to coordinate with green 
investment programmes to construct assets that enhance returns to these 
investments, thereby reducing their own fiscal cost and contributing to 




hand suppliers are assured of returns based on public co-financing, or if they can find 
informal ways of extending or renewing this financing or on skimping on the quality of 
results, their compulsion to control costs, maintain quality or to search for new 
markets may be lower. The actual financing gap may turn out to be (much) higher than 
the notional one and may even increase over time.  
 
The estimation of the actual financing gap is therefore closely tied to an assessment 
of the effectiveness of implementation, which we turn to in the next section. The 
notional estimate therefore needs to be adjusted on the basis of an evaluation of the 
feasibility of (re)designing the project in ways that can reduce leakages, taking into 
account the existing organizational capabilities, market structures and governance 
background. The revised estimate of actual financing costs with the best possible 
project and financing design should be taken as indicative, justifying small trials on 
selected projects that can then be scaled up.  
 
Finally, the net fiscal costs of public co-investments can be estimated from the 
financing gap by factoring in likely increases in tax revenues as a result of project 
implementation. Some projected tax revenues could be based on the project itself 
paying taxes, but there could also be taxes collected from indirect activities enabled 
by the project. For instance, if investments in an eco-tourism project are successful, 
we may expect an increase in business for tour guide companies, transportation 
companies and so on, and additional revenues may be roughly estimated. If such 
revenues are plausible, the net fiscal cost will be lower than the financing gap.  
 
For employment programmes, the financing gap and the net fiscal cost is usually 
identical because the entire spend in welfare programmes has to be covered by the 
taxpayer in most cases. Employment programmes do not create assets whose services 
can later be sold in the market, and they are therefore unlikely to attract private co-
investments. However, the net fiscal cost of welfare programmes can still be lower 
than their financing cost if the project increases tax revenues elsewhere. If so, the net 
fiscal cost may be lower, making the employment programme more sustainable. This 
is why employment and investment programmes need to be coordinated as much as 
possible to enhance the overall sustainability of the green strategy.  
 
 
3. Effectiveness of implementation  
The quality of implementation is likely to be the most important determinant of the 
sustainability of a green strategy in developing countries. To keep the argument 
flowing from the last section we discuss implementation effectiveness first and then 
turn to developmental impact, though implementation affects both costs and impacts 
simultaneously. The success of a building back greener strategy is likely to depend on 
Key takeaway: The financing cost and net fiscal cost of green programmes have to 
be estimated in two stages: a notional estimate of current market data and an 
adjustment based on the likely effectiveness of implementation  
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how well projects are identified that can be implemented to stay within budget and 
deliver at the quality required. In many cases, this is likely to involve redesigning 
projects and financing arrangements to improve the chances of effective 
implementation. 
 
Project design and conditions of financing  
Project design includes designing and interpreting the market research preceding the 
project, selecting projects with technical specifications aligned with the capabilities of 
the broadest range of suppliers, the methods of identifying the best suppliers, usually 
through competitive processes, and perhaps most importantly, designing projects to 
ensure that suppliers are effectively invested in the project so that their bottom lines 
depend on efficient and high quality delivery. The design of the co-financing 
instruments includes the methodology for estimating the financing gap, whether the 
financial support on offer is likely to attract a wide enough range of bidders to result 
in a competitive bid, the conditions under which project financing is likely to be 
withdrawn for poor performance, the credibility of the withdrawal threat, the 
penalties for failing to deliver at quality and on time, and the credibility of the 
enforcement of penalties.  
 
In contexts where formal contracts may not be easily enforceable, contracts have to 
be designed to increase the likelihood that suppliers will adhere to contracts in their 
own interest and deliver high quality products at low cost, with checks and balances 
that are credible in that context. Private incentives have to be attractive enough for 
investors to want to participate in projects, but they should also face compulsions to 
deliver in that governance context. Without addressing the implementation question 
to the best possible extent, the actual quality-adjusted delivery price is likely to be 
much higher than estimated, affecting both the financial viability of the project and its 
developmental impact.  
 
The evaluation of different project and financing designs has to be evidence-based 
and draw on experiences within the country. It can also draw on examples of subsidy 
design and studies of green project implementation in comparable developing 
countries. We have referred to the example of how different subsidy designs attracted 
different types of investors and induced very different investor responses in the power 
sector in Bangladesh. If there are grounds to believe that the notional estimates of the 
financing gap are unlikely to be met given the project and financing design and the 
enforceability of contracts, it may be sufficient for an evaluation to raise these 
questions and give a score to the implementation risk and the likely adjustment to the 
financing gap (and developmental impact discussed in the next section). This should 
be sufficient to justify a more cautious and experimental approach to project design 
in the green sector being considered, with alternative project and incentive designs 






Political economy considerations 
The contract and financing designs that are likely to achieve better implementation 
effectiveness will also depend on political economy considerations. This includes in 
particular the relative power and interests of different parties to the contract on both 
the supply side of the contracting (the supplier companies) and the demand side (the 
public bodies granting and monitoring contracts and making payments).  
 
On the supply side, the project design, contract design and funding arrangements can 
determine the types of suppliers that are attracted to bid. This immediately constrains 
the types of enforcement that are feasible because suppliers come with history, they 
may be part of established networks of businesses and public officials, they may have 
varying levels of bargaining power in informally negotiating contracts and so on. In 
Nepal many established business networks are powerfully connected and operate 
informal cartels. A key determinant of effective incentives and constraints will be to 
ensure as much as possible that new players are induced to bid for green contracts 
(subject to capabilities). This is not only because widening economic participation to 
include new players is aligned with DFIDN’s commitment to its three big changes, but 
also because new players may have different incentives and connections and it may 
be easier to design contracts that improve implementation outcomes.  
 
Selecting the appropriate green technologies may be critical, to align supported 
technologies with capabilities of new players, thereby improving both implementation 
effectiveness and broadening participation.  
 
The political economy incentives and interests of public officials on the supply side 
also need to be factored into the design of projects, contracts and financing 
arrangements. The power and status of public officials in any country depend on the 
resources they can dispense, both in general and even more so (in developing 
countries) in informally targeted ways to preferred clients and networks. The 
immediate concerns of different public officials involved in the oversight and 
management of projects may therefore include a preference for employment 
generation (in general or for particular clients), or the rapid granting of contracts (in 
general or to particular networks). There may also be competitive interests across 
different departments of governments, and in Nepal across different spheres of 
governance, each protecting their own interests and turf.  
 
In assessing and selecting projects, it is essential to keep in mind the preferences of 
public officials and how these may affect project selection and implementation. 
Sometimes these preferences may be aligned with the delivery of good-enough 
projects, sometimes not. In the latter cases, designing projects differently or selecting 
Key takeaway: Implementation performance is likely to depend very critically on 
aligning private incentives with good delivery outcomes given the limited 
governance capabilities that are available. 
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different projects may be the only feasible way of improving implementation 
outcomes in the short term. Improving governance capabilities and accountability is a 
parallel but much slower and longer-term process and cannot be relied on to improve 
the implementation or accountability of projects currently being considered. They 
have to be designed to work as well as they can be made to work in the current context.  
 
In Nepal it will be important to keep in mind differences in political contexts and 
governance in different parts of the country and in different spheres of the federal 
governance structure. Any sphere of government in Nepal’s federal system is likely to 
have specific interests and incentives that may affect what politicians and bureaucrats 
want projects to deliver. These interests and incentives may be different at federal, 
provincial and local spheres, as well as varying across Nepal. For DFIDN it will also be 
important to work in alignment with the spirit of the new constitution and the 
distribution of powers that it envisages and DFIDN’s own commitment to the three 
big changes. 
 
If the preferences of public officials are to implement projects to create employment 
for clients or to give contracts to connected companies, financing gaps and social 
impact criteria will obviously be affected. Similarly, if green growth strategies emerge 
as strategies that privilege some spheres of governance over others for reasons other 
than implementation effectiveness, outcomes may be diluted in pursuit of these 
objectives. The evidence from Nepal already suggests that political economy factors 
need to be considered to understand fund flows in climate change and disaster 
response projects (OPM 2019). 
 
These challenges are not simple, and there may be trade-offs. For instance, there may 
be trade-offs between selecting projects whose management responsibilities can be 
located in different spheres of government. One sphere may be relatively more prone 
to engage in excess employment but less prone to coordination failures across 
projects. Another may have better control of some costs but worse coordination 
across projects and so on. Add to this the importance of taking care not to distort the 
evolution of Nepal’s internal political settlement and the trade-offs can become tricky.  
It may not be possible to calculate the best response, but if in doubt, development 
partners should choose to do no harm and stay away from contentious project designs.  
 
When political economy constraints exist, the most feasible response may once again 
be to revisit project selection and design to select projects whose implementation is 
least likely to be distorted given the interests known to be at play. Nepal’s 
policymakers and development partners will have to take informed calls on these 
trade-offs in designing and locating projects based on the best available political 
economy information.  
 
Key takeaway: The political economies of supplier firms and public officials are 
important determinants of implementation effectiveness. There may also be trade-
offs between projects in different jurisdictions in Nepal’s spheres of governance 





Evidence and Evaluation  
Political economy evidence cannot directly put a monetary value on how 
implementation quality may affect the financing gap or the developmental impact in 
particular projects. Rather, the aim of an evidence-based political economy evaluation 
should be to identify how proposed projects and their design are likely to affect  
 
a) the capabilities of the delivery organizations that are likely to be selected by the 
selection processes being proposed  
 
b) the incentives and compulsions they are likely to face, as determined by the design 
of the project and financing structures, and the likely impact on cost-control, quality-
control and revenue-seeking behaviour, and  
 
c) the interests and incentives of public officials on the demand side and how this is 
likely to affect the pursuit of cost efficiency and developmental impact by delivery 
organizations. 
 
It should be possible to develop feasible ways of assessing and scoring on these criteria 
based on contextual political economy knowledge.  
 
If the result of this analysis is to downgrade the notional estimates of financing gaps 
or development impacts of particular projects, the evidence generated by the 
evaluation may also suggest how changes in project selection and design may help to 
align incentives on both the supply and demand sides to achieve better results. If the 
assessment suggests that these changes may be effective, and if the amended 
expected financing gaps and impacts are sustainable, the final step should be actual 
trials of specific projects and contracting models before scaling up.  
 
The last point is particularly important. Given the high implementation risks in the 
typical developing country, building back greener projects should be tested on the 
ground on a small scale before being scaled up. The methodology suggested is a way 
of containing these risks and building up a viable portfolio of green projects to be 
trialled and scaled up. 
 
 
4. Developmental impact  
For any given financing cost, the domestic political support for a green strategy is likely 
to depend critically on its impact on developmental goals like employment and 
Key takeaway: The aim of the political economy evaluation of the implementation 
effectiveness of particular projects is not to estimate the actual financing gap or 
the development impact, but as in a risk-assessment exercise, provide a risk-
adjusted downgrade of notional estimates of financing gaps (and developmental 
impacts) where necessary.  
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poverty reduction. Public investments in green strategies are more likely to be 
politically sustainable if they deliver impacts that both politicians and societies value. 
Employment generation supported by inclusive growth is also aligned with the three 
big changes supported by DFIDN.  
 
In poor countries, green projects that contribute more to jobs and poverty reduction 
for any given commitment of public resources are more likely to be supported, other 
things being equal. In contrast, projects that may otherwise have a big impact on 
global externalities like the reduction of greenhouse gases may enjoy little or no 
political support if they fail to generate developmental benefits for the domestic 
economy. Unless entirely funded by external resources, projects that contribute to the 
reduction of global externalities are only likely to be adopted on a sustained basis if 
some or all of the benefits can be monetized to achieve developmental impact, in 
particular to support inclusive growth through jobs and incomes in broad-based areas 
like eco-tourism. That is why we describe sustainable green projects in poor countries 
as those that deliver high developmental impact at a minimum fiscal cost, where 
developmental impact is appropriately understood.  
 
Developmental impact may be measured by criteria such as employment, poverty 
reduction and inclusive income growth. If we want to incorporate multiple objectives, 
we can score projects in terms of their contribution to each separately and use a 
composite indicator to rank projects. In most cases, not much may be lost by using a 
single simple indicator: sustainable job creation. This may miss some detail, but not so 
much that more complex indicators are necessarily justified. Other objectives like 
poverty reduction or income growth are likely to be correlated because sustainable 
job creation is usually the most powerful instrument for poverty reduction in 
developing countries. However, we also want to ensure job creation that reflects a 
broad-based economic transformation of Nepal in line with the three big changes. So 
we will also want to ensure that green jobs are widely dispersed across the country.  
 
As with estimates of financial gaps, the relevant impact of a project on jobs (or a 
composite impact indicator) has to be assessed over the lifetime of the project, not just 
during the construction phase. Some projects may have a large employment effect 
during a relatively short construction phase but a limited impact on employment 
thereafter. Others may have lower employment requirements during the construction 
phase but result in much greater employment generation later on by enabling new 
business opportunities. In developing countries, the second may be more relevant 
because it creates more sustainable ‘real’ jobs rather than subsidized jobs that 
construct an asset that is not afterwards very useful. The details of how best to 
estimate the sustained jobs impact will depend on the type of project.  
 
The development impact will also depend on ensuring that green projects do not 
suffer from skills mismatches or create too many offsetting job losses elsewhere in 
Nepal. The latter need to be accounted for in estimating impact. While some core skills 
may be transferable, specific skills for newer technologies may require policy makers 
and development partners to anticipate changes in skills training programmes. Hence 
future skill development strategies need to be closely aligned with the needs of green 
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growth projects. The ILO suggests (Gregg, et al. 2015) that labour force surveys could 
be used to generate estimates for sustainable employment within each green sub-
sector. This approach can be refined to look at the skills requirements of specific 
projects to develop supportive skills programmes. In Nepal’s case the skills profile of 
any workers returning from abroad will be closely aligned with the migration economy 
(for instance in construction and security services). The returning work force is unlikely 




The likely employment generation potential of green projects is not necessarily easy 
to estimate, particularly if we are trying to estimate impacts on longer-term 
sustainable job creation. Looking across countries with similar investments may 
provide us a notional estimate, but the actual will depend on the quality of project 
implementation. Once again, the measurement and evaluation strategy should be a 
two-stage one, with a notional first estimate based on cross-country estimates (if 
available) followed by an implementation-adjusted estimate of the likely actual impact.  
 
A particular problem in cross-country estimates of developmental impact is that 
advanced and developing countries benefit from green projects in different ways. 
Advanced countries are likely to enjoy long-term benefits from investment in high 
value-adding R&D or manufacturing activities that are triggered when governments 
support the development of green technologies. The employment generated in such 
activities has technological spinoffs that may allow employment in these activities to 
be sustained after the project. As a result, employment generation at the 
development phase is more likely to be sustained beyond the specific project, and 
further employment may be generated by marketing the goods and services produced 
by green assets. In contrast, the employment generation in developing countries 
during the installation phase is likely to involve installing technology developed and 
purchased from elsewhere, and constructing  basic infrastructure (Hepburn, et al. 
2020). Once the installation is over, there are likely to be fewer spinoffs for the 
organizations engaged in the installation, and the employment in these activities is 
likely to end. Any sustained employment benefit in developing countries is likely to be 
the indirect effect of green investments opening up new business opportunities. This 
is why care is required in interpreting summaries of likely employment effects of green 
projects that do not make careful distinctions between advanced and developing 
countries (such as McKinsey & Company 2020).  
 
As with estimates of financing gaps, the estimation of developmental impacts should 
be a two-stage process to account for implementation quality. An initial estimate of 
Key takeaway: For any given financing cost, the political support for a green 
strategy is likely to depend on its developmental impact on employment and 
poverty reduction. Public co-financing of green projects is more likely to be 
sustainable if they deliver impacts that both politicians and societies value. 
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impact can be based on the size of the proposed programme (construction-phase 
employment) and potential employment in ongoing businesses (if the project is an 
investment) or indirect jobs created (in case of public assets built by employment 
programmes).  
 
These estimates of potential jobs are again notional, because actual jobs are difficult 
to predict, and numbers will depend critically on the quality of the assets constructed 
and subsequent management. As with the financing gap, a feasible strategy is to 
complement estimates of notional (best-case) impact with an implementation risk-
adjusted estimate that qualifies the initial estimate.  
 
As with estimates of financing costs, the implementation-quality adjusted estimate of 
impact is initially likely to be too low to place most projects in the sustainable project 
space in Figure 1. But once again, it may be possible to improve implementation 
quality in the way suggested earlier, by aligning incentives and capabilities with 
market and governance conditions to achieve the best possible impact. This exercise 
could then lead to small trials to assess opportunities of scaling up projects that 
promise to be sustainable ones.  
 
 
5. Project selection and design  
Based on these observations, we suggest a sequential assessment of evidence to 
identify sustainable building-back-greener projects. To organize the search in an 
efficient way, the early stages of screening could be done less rigorously, using 
available evidence to identify the really promising projects where it is worth investing 
in more detailed analysis of implementation feasibility and suggesting detailed 
improvements. This should lead to the identification of a relatively small number of 
projects suitable for empirically testing feasibility in small-scale trials. 
 
Key takeaway: An initial estimate of impact can be based on estimates of the size 
of the proposed programme (construction-phase employment) and the expected 
impact on potential employment generation (in running the businesses enabled 
by these investments). Both will need to be qualified by assessments of 




Figure 2 Proposed evaluation and selection ‘funnel’  
 
The sequential assessment strategy suggested in the selection and evaluation funnel 
in Figure 2 deliberately requires less demanding data and analysis for steps higher up 
the funnel where more projects are being considered. Intensive evaluation may not 
make a significant difference to project selection or design at this stage. We can then 
restrict the more intensive analysis to projects lower down the funnel where fewer 
projects remain. Steps 1 to 4 should take comparatively less effort, but they are 
necessary to filter out unsustainable projects, while the shaded steps, 5 to 7, need to 
be done more carefully. The aim should be to balance accuracy with the practical 
consideration of keeping the selection and project development process simple 
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